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SÍNTESE – Este artigo analisa o debate acerca dos
atributos divinos na teologia islâmica medieval
(kalam), mais especificamente na teologia mu‘tazilita 
e ash‘arita. Nele se compara a abordagem da teo-
logia islâmica medieval com a de Moisés Maimó-
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meira metade do século IX, e analisa a reação dos
ash‘aritas que se seguiu e que insistiu em considerar
os atributos divinos enquanto entidades reais, sepa-
radas da essência de Deus. Maimónides, conhecedor
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The issue of divine attributes is one which cuts across particular religions and 
historical periods. It is shared by Christian, Muslim and Jewish philosophers and 
theologians alike. It stems not only from a reflection on the Scriptural description of 
God, but also from a general need to understand the divine and its nature. Jewish, 
Christian, and Muslim philosophers and theologians, in the monotheistic tradition, 
who tackled God’s attributes were confronted with several obstacles to the 
affirmation of such attributes, the most obvious of which is perhaps God’s oneness. 
If real attributes are predicated of him, the principle of divine oneness is called into 
question, since that oneness consists precisely in his being simple and indivisible 
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under any aspect. And not only is God’s oneness stated in the Scriptures but also it 
constitutes a fundamental principle in the philosophers’ argument for his eternity 
and perfection. That which is simple cannot perish, because coming to be and 
passing away is the result of a combination of elements in any given substance, 
more specifically form and matter, as had been asserted by the ancient Greek 
philosophers. Also, that which is not composed of matter and contains no material 
element, and so occupies no space, is per se indivisible. On the other hand, how can 
we speak about God without reference to his attributes, i.e., his qualities? And if 
positive attributes are not to be said or thought of God, then what is the status of 
the descriptions of God to be found in the Old and the New Testament or in the 
Qur’an, the sources of a number of divine attributes accepted by the theologians? 
Any discourse about God within a religious framework is bound to bring with it a 
statement of his eternity, omnipotence, omniscience, to name but a few of his 
attributes. 
This prompts another problem akin to that of God’s attributes: the question of 
anthropomorphism and anthropomorphic descriptions of the Godhead. If one 
describes God as undergoing affections, having feelings of love or hatred towards his 
subjects and if we describe any particular features of his such as bodily features, 
does this not constitute an assimilation of God to a human being? This is part of the 
wider question of the relation between God and his creation, in particular human 
beings. Can any similarity or resemblance be explained without distorting the true 
nature of the divine? If there is no analogy and no relation, where do we base our 
belief in God’s existence? And if there is no relation between us and the divine 
being, in the sense that he cannot be affected by any of our actions, what is the 
purpose of religion and its rituals? These are some of the issues that underpin the 
debate that divided philosophers and theologians throughout the medieval period. 
In this discussion one can make a conceptual distinction between three planes: 
the ontological, which discusses the analogy between God and man as beings; the 
epistemological, whether we can know the divine, and whether our mind is capable 
of grasping the divine nature; and the logical or linguistic plane of our language 
concerning God, in other words the truth of the propositions we use to talk about 
him. Although for the philosophers standing in the Greek tradition the logical is of 
the same order as the ontological the distinction between these two planes becomes 
increasingly apparent as the inquiry into this problem becomes more refined, and 
especially so with Maimonides’ contribution. In the following I shall limit myself to 
the ontological and logical planes and will not deal with human knowledge, which 
deserves a separate discussion. 
Maimonides, as it appears in his writings, in particular the Guide of the 
Perplexed, where he expounds and proposes to solve the problem, was conversant 
not only with the early Muslim theological debates of divine attributes, but also with 
the philosophy, mostly written in Arabic, that ensued from the discussions arising in 
the Islamic theological schools. His contribution clearly takes into account these 
previous debates and therefore I shall start with an exposition of the Mu‘tazilite and 
the Ash‘arite views.   119
The Mu‘tazilite stance 
It is unsurprising that the issue of divine attributes should have occupied such a 
central place in the several schools of kalam (Islamic theology) that developed after 
the death of Muhammad and well into the height of the Abbasid empire, if one takes 
into account the text of the Qur’an revealed to Muhammad in the early seventh 
century C.E. Less descriptive and history-based than either the Old or the New 
Testament, the Qur’an concentrates very much on divine action and on divine 
nature. It is in addition the source of the divine names with which God is credited in 
the Muslim tradition, and some Muslim theologians found over a thousand 
adjectives (which stands for the Arabic term sifa) attached to the divine subject. 
Those sifat often stand for the name of God in the Qur’an, which is Allah. God can 
be referred to by any of those names, and any interpretation of the Qur’an to be 
undertaken by any Muslim theological school had necessarily to include the analysis 
of those terms on a grammatical as well as on a theological/‘speculative’ level. 
Consequently, some scholars of Islam defended that the divine attributes were the 
central issue of Islamic theology.
1 
Among the two principal schools of Islamic theology, one, the Mu‘tazilites, took 
to interpret the attributes mentioned in the Qur’an – for the debate developed out of 
an exegetical analysis of Scripture – as being part and parcel of the divine essence 
and identical with it. The other school, the Ash‘arites, took the view that these 
attributes are real entities, subsisting independently of the divine essence. The 
Mu‘tazilite view is underpinned by a more metaphorical interpretation of the 
Scripture and the second by with a literalist interpretation. 
The Mu‘tazilites were the first school of Islamic theology to take a definite 
position on the issue of God’s attributes, and to favour its identification with the 
divine essence. This school was founded in Basra during the first half of the eighth 
century by Wasil b. ‘Ata’ (d. 748) and flourished in the first half of the ninth century 
C.E in the Abbasid empire. The stress on the createdness of the Qur’an became 
State dogma as decreed by the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun (d. 833 CE). The 
Mu‘tazilites by and large defended the unity of God and his attributes, in order to 
highlight God’s oneness (tawhid). Owing to this, they were labelled the ahl al-‘adl 
wa-l-tawhid, the partisans of (God’s) justice and oneness.
2 The main principles of 
classical Mu‘tazilism were formulated by Abu-l-Hudhayl (d. 841) and they consisted 
in God’s oneness, God’s justice, God’s fulfilment of his promises in the Hereafter, 
the existence of an intermediate state between belief and unbelief (e.g., a Muslim 
who has sinned) and the obligation to ‘command the just and forbid the evil’.
3 
Consequently, God is the one eternal being, dismissing any claim that his 
attributes, separated from him, or even the Qur’an, as the word of God, can be said 
to be eternal. Any attribute, such as his power, knowledge, justice, must needs be 
one with him, not having a real (ontic) separate existence, as they have when 
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predicated of any other being.
4 Therefore, God is said to be knowing, but by virtue of 
his essence, and powerful by virtue of his essence, and likewise with all his other 
attributes. He is not knowing, powerful in virtue of Knowledge or Power themselves, 
not only because this would lead to a multiplicity being predicated of God but also 
because it would imply to posit other eternal entities alongside God. The 
Mu‘tazilites, therefore, identify power and wisdom themselves with him, and he is 
said to be, for instance power and wisdom and justice. In this way, they sought to 
highlight the fundamental difference between the divine plane and the human plane. 
God possesses his attributes eternally, man and material substances only fleetingly. 
Man’s existence and power derive from God but are not eternal, as they are in him. 
This differentiation between the divine and the human natures established by the 
Mu‘tazilites is further illustrated by their metaphorical interpretation of some of the 
well known attributes and descriptions of God in the Qur’an. These are 
anthropomorphic descriptions such as his hand, his face, and his seat on the throne 
in Heaven.
5 The Mu‘tazilites deemed these descriptions to be unsuitable, if taken 
literally to refer to the Godhead. If he is eternal and omnipotent, how can he be said 
to have the characteristics of a material substance? Moreover a body occupies a 
limited space, and God is infinite, and does not reside in space or in time. His 
eternity consists in an absence of any relation to time. Consequently, the 
Mu‘tazilites took these Qur’anic expressions of God’s hand and face, to mean, 
allegorically, his power and his knowledge. With regard to the Qur’anic description 
of God’s sitting on his throne, they interpreted it as signifying God’s omnipotence.
6 
The Mu‘tazilites thus stressed God’s uniqueness and his being unlike any earthly 
being. In addition, they applied negative attributes to the deity.
7 Their position 
would have significant repercussions. The Muslim philosophers who came under the 
influence of Greek philosophical tradition took a position that was closer to the 
Mu‘tazilite than to that propounded by the theological school of the Ash‘arites, who 
were to criticise the Mu‘tazilites and win the upper hand against them as 
champions of Islamic orthodoxy. 
The Ash‘arite response 
An emphatic response to the Mu‘tazilite identification of God with his attributes 
and their metaphorical interpretation of the Qur’an – as well as their defence of the 
createdness of Qur’an – came from Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), a Muslim theologian 
and jurist, founder of the Hanbalite madhhab, one of the four schools of law in the 
Sunni tradition. He was persecuted by the authorities during the time of the mihna – 
caliph al-Ma’mun’s inquisition to enforce Mu‘tazilite positions – for proclaiming the 
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Qur’an as the uncreated speech of God. He also held that the descriptions to be 
found in the Qur’an, even the anthropomorphic ones, were to be taken at face value, 
but without questioning its true meaning (bi-la kayfa).
8 Ibn Hanbal turned the tide of 
Muslim theology by opposing the prevalent Mu‘tazilite tendencies of his day. His 
position would become remarkably influential in the course of time. 
Al-Ash‘ari (d. 935), a Muslim theologian who studied under one of the leading 
Mu‘tazilite theologians of his day, rejected Mu‘tazilism at the age of forty, particularly 
with regard to Qur’anic interpretation. He followed in the vein of Ibn Hanbal in 
adhering closer to the letter of the Scripture. Also, he strongly criticised the Mu‘tazilite 
dogma of divine attributes. Opposing Mu‘tazilite theology, al-Ash‘ari held that the 
attributes are real entities subsisting independently of God. He claimed that God is 
powerful by virtue of a power residing in him, and wise by virtue of a wisdom residing 
in him. His critique was founded on a stress on the attributes as real and eternal 
entities, and on the claim that positing the attributes as equal to the divine essence 
amounts to a denial of those attributes.
9 This is in line with the Muslim theologians’ 
identification of the sifat allah with real entities (ma‘ani) residing in the essence of 
God.
10 The sifat allah, according to al-Ash‘ari, do not just refer to divine predicates, 
such as living, powerful, wise. Indeed, in linguistic terms, the sifat allah refer 
specifically to the nouns describing those entities, such as power and life existing in 
God, and the adjectives could not possibly be predicated of God if he were deprived of 
those real entities. However, the Mu‘tazilites do not view these attributes as ma‘ani.
11 
Moreover, according to Sunni theologians, the rule for predication in general is based 
on two principles, to wit (a) every adjective has a cause (‘illa), a reason for existing 
which is the corresponding noun,
12 and (b) the principle of the analogy of the invisible 
with the visible. The fact that those entities reside in him means that he possesses 
them in a way that is not to be found in humans, in whom they do not reside but are 
merely attached.
13 For example, God possesses will as an eternal attribute, humans 
possess it as an accident
14 Therefore, these predicates, such as living, powerful, can 
only be properly ascribed to God, not to man. They are said differently of man and 
God. According to al-Ash‘ari, to use the same predicates to describe God and man 
does not mean that we are setting up a strict similarity between the two, for God 
possesses these predicates from all eternity.
15 However, the term sifa entails some 
ambiguity in al-Ash‘ari, for it sometimes refers to the predicate, for example, powerful, 
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sometimes also to the qualities possessed, in this case power.
16 There is also an 
ambiguity in the acceptance of corporeal descriptions as real attributes of God.
17 Al-
Ash‘ari accepts them without committing himself strictly to a literal or a metaphorical 
interpretation, which is in conformity with the ancient interpretation of the ahl al-
hadith,
18 a group in early Islamic theology and law which was opposed to the ahl al-
ra’y, more in favour of a free interpretation of the Islamic sacred texts, including the 
Qur’an and the Sunna. 
Al-Ash‘ari draws an important distinction between attributes of essence 
(subdivided into nafsiyya, in which the name is identical with the thing named, and 
ma‘nawiyya, which are neither similar nor dissimilar to the thing named) and 
attributes of action, where a difference can be observed between that which is 
named and the name.
19 Moreover, among the eight essential attributes, life, 
knowledge, power, will, hearing, sight, speech and duration, the first four are known 
in a positive way and the last four in a negative way, i.e., by negating in God the 
opposite imperfections.
20 This differentiation between attributes known through 
affirmation and negation prefigures Maimonides’ solution. 
Al-Ash‘ari also criticises the identification between God and his attributes from a 
logical point of view. For him, one has to say that God is knowing through a 
knowledge existing in him. This is due to his definition of knowledge, ‘that by which 
the knower knows that which he knows’, this being what distinguishes it from the 
other attributes. If God is made identical with his attributes, one is forced to accept the 
absurdity that the knowledge is knowing, or that the knower is the knowledge.
21 There 
must needs be a conceptual differentiation between the knowledge and the knower, 
corresponding to a real difference of entities denoted by the terms used. If everything 
were identical in God, as stated in the principle that there are no distinctions to be 
made within the divine essence, then justice and knowledge would be identical in 
God, and God would have to be said to know through his justice as much as through 
his knowledge, which goes against al-Ash‘ari’s definition of knowledge. 
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The Mu‘tazilites would argue that the use of an adjective/attribute to qualify 
the subject corresponds to affirming in that subject/substance the existence of the 
corresponding quality, and that this is valid for all existents. They would also say 
that although God’s knowledge is convertible with him, the inverse is not the 
case. These two theses would provide some, though not essential, differentiation 
between God and his attributes, so as to obviate the Ash‘arite objection. 
For his part, and in order to forestall objections to the effect that positing 
real attributes in God is tantamount to a denial of his simplicity, al-Ash‘ari 
states that in God, knowledge is neither identical to his power nor other than it. 
This a controversial and obscure response to the Mu‘tazilite position, but it 
constitutes the Ash‘arite solution to the problem of multiplicity when real 
attributes are predicated of God. Al-Ash‘ari claims that the attributes are neither 
identical with God nor other than him, a distinction with includes both similarity 
and difference.
22 But whereas similarity and difference belong to the plane of 
essence, otherness belongs to the plane of existence. For al-Ash‘ari, there are 
two definitions of otherness: (a) if a thing is other with respect to another, then 
one can be said to exist and the other not to exist, or (b) there is a possibility of 
one existing separately of the other in time or space. But in reality none of these 
apply to God and his attributes,
23 hence the inconsistency of al-Ash‘ari’s claim. 
The solution, it would seem to me, would consist in a clearer distinction to 
be drawn between the logical and the ontological planes. Both parties are 
treating the attributes with a stress on the ontological plane, a treatment that is 
bound to produce difficulties in connection with God. This distinction is not 
clear-cut in the Ash‘arite/Mu‘tazilite debate, but Maimonides moves closer in 
that direction, as has been noticed by Wolfson. We shall see how, according to 
Wolfson, by introducing Aristotelian categories/terminology into the age-old 
debate about divine attributes, not only does Maimonides lay open the complex 
nature of the problem in its diverse aspects (ontological, epistemological and 
logical/linguistic) but he also contributes greatly to a solution which, within an 
Aristotelian framework, incorporates the preceding considerations. 
In addition to a stress on the ontological level, another similarity between 
Ash‘arites and Mu‘tazilites, in their reasoning concerning the attributes, is that 
they both draw on the analogy between God and humans, and between the 
Creator and his Creation,
24 although the Mu‘tazilites are more reluctant to accept 
a direct analogy, especially in so far as the anthropomorphic or revealed 
attributes are concerned. 
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Maimonides’ approach 
Maimonides, while conversant with his predecessors’ position on divine 
attributes, has a radically different view in that he takes the absolute difference 
between humans and God as his starting and fundamental point. This had already 
been advocated by certain Muslim and Christian authors, particularly the champions 
of negative theology, which had Neoplatonic echoes. Such theologians would hold 
that God cannot be grasped by any knowledge.
25 Negative theology was also 
propounded by Plotinus (d. 270 A.D.) – the foremost exponent of Neoplatonism, 
himself wary of postulating a multiplicity in God – as the only possible discourse 
about God. Plotinus goes to such lengths to stress the transcendence of the One 
that even the predicate of being is inadequately applied to him. The One is beyond 
being. Like Maimonides a millenium after him, Plotinus does not wish to state the 
essence of the One or circumscribe it.
26 A need arises to refer to God exclusively by 
means of negative attributes, because the attributes applied to man cannot 
adequately describe God. 
This radical difference between God and man, which resulted in a negative 
theology, was also the characteristic of certain theological schools of Islam, such as 
the Jahmiyya and the Isma‘ilis, the latter having found favour with Alfarabi, a 
Muslim philosopher who had immense influence on Maimonides. 
But although Maimonides was acquainted with the previous Islamic theological 
debates, he takes a specific approach by tackling the matter in a distinctively rational, 
argumentative and logical way, where most theologians had taken a position which 
was mystical rather than argumentative. Notwithstanding this he does not lose sight 
of the Jewish religious monotheistic tradition, and in fact shows an effort to keep with 
the true spirit of tradition. Furthermore, unlike Ash‘arites and Mu‘tazilites, he does not 
accept the principle of the analogy of the invisible to the visible. 
He starts by stating that affirming the oneness of God cannot go pari passu with 
a belief in essential attributes, as it would represent a belief in a multiplicity.
27 Is 
becomes clear at once that Maimonides makes no concessions in his defence of 
monotheism. He rejects from the start the theory of essential attributes said of God, 
because God cannot be divided in any sense. Because his approach is based on an 
analysis of logical propositions, as we shall see, this implies not just a real division in 
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God, but also a conceptual division.
28 A multiplicity of essential attributes would 
entail a multiplicity in the essence of God and in our perception and language about 
it, and must therefore be rejected. The denial of essential attributes, according to 
Maimonides, is a primary intelligible because ‘an attribute is not the essence of the 
thing of which it is predicated’,
29 and this becomes clear in his logical treatment of 
predication. A logical treatment of predication implies an analysis of the divine 
attributes in terms of logical propositions, that is, in terms of any sentence, 
comprising a subject and predicate, referring to God. This is how Maimonides 
proceeds to treat the problem. 
According to Maimonides, an attribute can be twofold. It can be (a) ‘the 
essence of the thing of which it is predicated’.
30 In this case the relation between 
subject and predicate is one of tautology, such as to say that ‘man is man’, in 
which case it is also superfluous. Or (b) the predicate is an explanation, or 
definition, of the subject. It may also be that ‘the attribute is different from the 
thing of which it is predicated, being a notion superadded to that thing’.
31 In this 
case, the predicate signifies something more than the subject itself. A difficulty 
immediately arises. To say that God is God is superfluous. A sentence referring to 
God cannot be an explanation, a statement of his essence, for he cannot be 
defined. The Aristotelian definition comprises the genus and differentia of the 
definiendum and God, as an infinite being, cannot be classed under a genus. And 
if the attribute predicated of the divine includes something that is not in the 
subject (that is not in him) then a multiplicity will arise in the divine subject which 
contravenes the assumption of his oneness. Maimonides’ aim is to define the 
limits of our language about God, as expressed in sentences containing a subject 
and a predicate, without having to admit only the tautologous propositions as 
valid when referring to God, since the sentences stating the essence of God or 
crediting him with a superadded notion must be discarded. Maimonides’ proceeds 
to explain in greater detail the meaning of ‘attribute’. 
Maimonides analyses any positive attribute as falling under five classes. An 
attribute is either a definition of the thing of which it is predicated, or part of the 
definition; it can also be a quality, a relation or an action. 
The first two are rejected by Maimonides, because God cannot be defined or his 
essence divided, following the Aristotelian analysis already mentioned. Aristotle 
defines man as a ‘rational animal’, ‘animal’ designating the genus and ‘rational’ the 
differentia. But defining God in a similar manner is impossible, because he cannot 
be subsumed under any genus or species, or any corresponding differentia. 
Traditionally, the Muslim philosophers and Maimonides held the view that the 
genus and species to which any being belongs are not merely logical categories but 
entail also a degree of causal reality in relation to the beings which they subsume. In 
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this sense, God cannot belong to any genus, let alone species, otherwise he would 
somehow be caused by them, and it is God who creates genera and species, since 
he is the cause of all intelligibles. A tenuous line can be seen to separate the 
ontological and the logical plane. Obviously, God could not have part of a definition 
predicated of him. According to Maimonides, ‘if he has a part of an essence, his 
essence must be composite’.
32 We are faced with the same problem as when 
predicating an essence of him, for having part of an essence predicated, say 
‘rational’, is again subsuming God under a genus or species. 
The attribute considered as quality is rejected by Maimonides because it does 
not explain the essence, it ‘is not a thing through which the essence is perfected 
and constituted’,
33 but a superadded notion. Furthermore, quality is one of the ten 
Aristotelian categories which serve to classify any substance, and are said of a the 
subject as an accident inheres in a substance. But God, for several medieval 
philosophers, is not a substance. He is not a compound of different elements, of form 
and matter, and he is not a substratum for accidents. The error of endowing God 
with an attribute of quality is further illustrated by Maimonides’ in expanding on the 
four genera of qualities. Quality can refer to (a) a person’s moral habits or 
dispositions, such as to say that a person is chaste; or to (b) a natural property, for 
instance if substance is soft or hard; or to (c) an affection, such as mercy, or to (d) 
‘quantity considered as such’, for example length. By virtue of the fact that God is 
not a body, (b) and (d) are automatically excluded. And because God does not have 
a soul – and consequently is not constituted by different faculties – and does not 
receive affections (a) and (c) are equally discarded. So much for the attribute of 
quality. 
Attribute understood as relation is considered not to entail multiplicity, for a 
person can bear relations to different entities – for example the same person can be 
a mother and a daughter in relation to other persons, but it does not apply to God 
because there is no relation between him and the world. Maimonides highlights the 
absolute transcendence of the divine. There are other, more specific reasons for 
Maimonides’ rejection of the attribute of relation as predicated of God. One such 
reason is that there is no relation between him and the world because nothing can 
be said of him in the same way that it is said of the world and its substances. Not 
even ‘existence’ can be predicated of humans as it is of God. Existence can solely 
be said of man and God by way of absolute equivocation. Equivocal predication, in 
Aristotle, refers to entities (in this case, attributes) bearing the same name but 
having a different definition,
34 so that the analogy in predicating the same attribute 
of man and God is casual, and does not point to an essential similarity. The other 
reason is that, according to Maimonides, there can only be a relation between two 
beings that belong to the same species. Yet God does not share a genus with 
humans or any other being. Therefore, one cannot employ the attribute of relation in 
any sentence about God. 
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The only positive attribute accepted by Maimonides for predication regarding 
the divine subject is an attribute of action, which also marks the boundary of what 
we can positively say of God. We cannot know God himself, because he bears no 
relation to the created world, but we know the effect of his actions in this world. 
Maimonides had to find a kind of logical predication in sentences referring to God 
without limiting himself to a merely tautologous (and superfluous) proposition
35 but 
also without drawing on an non-existing similarity between God and man. As a 
consequence, he prefers the attributes of action predicated of God in a 
‘proposition consisting of a subject and a finite verb’, rather than a ‘proposition 
consisting of a subject and predicate connected by the copula’.
36 In the former, 
‘the predicate and the subject can be identical without making the proposition 
tautological’. The attributes of action belong to a specific kind of predication 
which allows us to say something positive about the divine subject without an 
attempt to describe its essence – perhaps the most original contribution of 
Maimonides’ to divine predication. In using Aristotelian logic, he finds a way of 
establishing the limits and possibilities of our language about God without losing 
sight of the Scriptural spirit. The Aristotelian method is employed for theological 
and philosophical purposes in order to clarify the main issues involving predication 
of the divine. This clarification was made possible by Maimonides’ ingenious use 
of an Aristotelian framework of inquiry. Furthermore, it complies both with the 
Scriptural principle of an ever active and creative God and with the Aristotelian 
conception of God as pure activity and intellect. If no attributes could be asserted 
of God, how to understand the scriptural references to God? Scripture contains 
above all a description of God’s  acts and his interaction with humans since 
creation. Thus Maimonides’ solution, which allows attributes of action as the only 
positive predication of God is in perfect compliance with the Old Testament’s 
description of God. And, as mentioned before, it does not try to define his 
essence, which would anthropomorphise him. Although predication through the 
use of attributes of action does not encroach on God’s essence, these acts 
according to Maimonides are carried by means of his simple essence.
37 
Maimonides’ position on divine attributes of action represents a concession 
to the use of attributes, which is necessary if we are to speak meaningfully 
about God. His approach focuses on the linguistic aspect of the problem, as we 
have seen, whilst bearing on important issues such as the wider problem of our 
relationship with God. Without attributes to speak and think about God, any 
religious discourse would be void. This would constitute just as serious an 
obstacle to a theistic stance as anthropomorphism, which assimilates God to 
human beings and undermines his transcendence. Maimonides, while keeping 
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with a rigorous view on God’s oneness and transcendence, felt the need to 
strike a balance between sheer anthropomorphism and a divested view of God 
that might border on agnosticism. This he does not only by allowing attributes 
of action to be predicated of him (and as we have seen al-Ash‘ari had already 
distinguished between attributes of action and attributes of the essence), but 
also by allowing negative attributes to be said of him. Positive attributes other 
than attributes of action must be excluded, and in this Maimonides is much 
stricter than al-Ghazzali, who takes attributes said of God and man alike to be 
univocal. He is also stricter than Averroes, who in spite of asserting that the 
terms or attributes referring to God and to humans are predicated by 
equivocation (bi-’ishtirak), is not quite as reluctant as Maimonides in accepting 
positive predication in relation to God. 
I shall explain al-Ghazzali’s and Averroes’ views before proceeding with the 
exposition of Maimonides’ account of negative attributes. 
The polemic between Mu‘tazilites and Ash‘arites regarding divine attributes 
and the wider issue of scriptural exegesis continued in the debate between al-
Ghazzali (d.1111), a theologian of the Ash‘arite school who defended a more 
literal interpretation of the Qur’an, and the Muslim philosophers, who shared a 
common speculative approach with the Mu‘tazilites (albeit without sharing 
many of their views) and were influenced by the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian 
tradition. The falasifa had a twofold task, supporting a speculative approach to 
the Qur’an and championing Greek, i.e., pagan and foreign (in the eyes of the 
theologians) science. Al-Ghazzali, the most influential Muslim theologian of all 
times, explicitly accuses the philosophers of denying God’s attributes in the 
sixth discussion of his Tahafut al-falasifa (The Incoherence the Philosophers), 
and faults them for holding the position that the Mu‘tazilites had held before.
38 
In addition he accused the philosophers of kufr (heresy), on three counts: 
their views on the eternity of the world, their theory that God knows particulars 
in a universal way and their denial of bodily resurrection. His main target was 
Avicenna (d. 1037), but it extended to all philosophers following Greek science 
and philosophy, and a conception of God that departed from the explicit text of 
the Qur’an. The main bone of contention lay in divergent conceptions of God. 
Al-Ghazzali defended a personal God. There is, for him, a clear analogy between 
God and humans, even though God possesses his attributes in a way different to 
humans. According to al-Ghazzali, their viewing God as a merely intellectual 
renders the use of such terms as ‘agent’ and ‘creator’ nugatory. Again, the issue 
is: how are the divine attributes mentioned in the Qur’an to be understood and 
interpreted? 
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Averroes (d.1198), a contemporary of Maimonides, his countryman (both 
hailed from Cordoba) and an Aristotelian like him, offers a point-by-point 
response to al-Ghazzali’s criticism in the Tahafut al-Tahafut. Averroes’ chief 
response against the criticism poured on the philosophers, whose overall 
positions he defends, is to stress the difference existing between God’s and 
man’s nature on several counts. Averroes emphasises, against al-Ghazzali, that 
the philosophers do grant God a will, with the proviso it differs from human will. 
They also accord him knowledge, which it is not to be confused with human 
knowledge or understood through an analogy between God’s knowledge and 
human knowledge. As regards these attributes, will and knowledge, they are 
predicated of God and humans alike by sheer homonymy or equivocation, which 
as we have seen is in Aristotle tantamount to saying that they bear different 
definitions. The Arabic expression used by Averroes in several of his works to 
denote homonymy is bi-l-ishtirak, literally, by equivocation, or by sharing the 
same designation, but not the same definition.
39 In spite of this qualification, 
Averroes accepts that God’s attributes are identical with his essence, and that 
we can speak of God’s knowledge. In this he does not go as far as Maimonides’, 
who denies any positive predication of God with the exception of negative 
attributes and attributes of action. It is yet to be established whether Averroes 
had a textual influence upon Maimonides, since they were contemporaries. At 
any rate the latter’s stance on attributes comes across as a development and 
radicalisation of Averroes’ conception of divine versus human attributes. 
Maimonides’ contention that these are to be taken as completely equivocal is 
best understood in his use of negative attributes with regard to God. 
Because there is no relation between God and the world, the terms we use 
to describe the world cannot be applied to God, also because, according to 
Maimonides, our language is limited in scope.
40 Therefore, it is necessary to 
establish what we can validly say about God. In addition to attributes of action 
one may use negative attributes, which refer indirectly to the divine essence, 
and enable us to acquire a certain grasp of divine nature. There are several 
advantages in using negative attributes. They entail no multiplicity, they say 
nothing about the essence of God as such, which is a mystery that the human 
mind cannot attain, but they allow for some particularisation, which is vital if we 
are to speak and think about God. Similarly, all affirmative attributes that are 
applied to God must be interpreted as denying the opposite of what they state. 
To say that God is just means to say that he is not unjust, thereby excluding 
him from the set of beings that are unjust. This does not involve placing God 
under any set, i.e., genus or species. Furthermore, the limits Maimonides 
imposes on our language about God are so narrow that he himself speaks of 
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positive attributes when talking about God in his Guide. This must be seen not 
as a device to confuse the reader or as a flagrant contradiction, but as putting 
into practice the principle according to which there are several kinds of 
language one can use to speak about God, depending on the level of 
understanding and intellectual training of the addressee, a distinction that harks 
back to Aristotle and is present in his Greek commentators and the Muslim 
theologians.
41 This is what Maimonides explicitly states in his introduction to the 
Guide of the Perplexed as one of the causes to ‘account for the contradictory or 
contrary statements to be found in any book or compilation’.
42 And this rule is 
clearly applied in Maimonides’ treatment of divine attributes because he 
proceeds from explaining the simpler aspect, which is the application of 
attributes of action, to the most difficult, which is the use of negative attributes 
to refer to God. 
Maimonides’ discussion of attributes of action and negative attributes is a 
coherent and logically consistent way of tackling the problem of multiplicity 
caused by an affirmation of positive attributes in God. It defines the acceptable 
boundaries of human speech when referring to God, and keeps to the principles 
of God’s absolute oneness and transcendence that constitute the foundations of 
a monotheistic stance. 
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